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The Houle decision is consistent with the view of the majority of
lower courts and reaffirms the fourth amendment's role as protector of
the home against unreasonable intrusions. Supreme Court dicta, how-
ever, conflict on the issue,36 leading some commentators to speculate in
light of Watson and Santana 37 that the Court will abolish the public-
private distinction and the warrant requirement for in-home arrests. 3 8
The question may be resolved soon because the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on the issue in another case.39
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT-HouSING-UNIFORM RELOCATION
ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO PRIVATE DEVELOPER WITH EMINENT Do-
MAIN POWERS. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979). Plain-
tiffs' sought a preliminary injunction to restrain work in a planned
36. Compare United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (one may not escape arrest by
fleeing to private place) and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (Court has never invali-
dated an arrest based, on probable cause because officers failed to obtain warrant), with United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. at 45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("in the absence of exigent circum-
stances, the police may not arrest a suspect without a warrant") and McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 314 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("normally an arrest should be made only on a warrant
issued by a magistrate on a showing of 'probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,' as
required by the Fourth Amendment").
37. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
38. The Santana decision constituted "a significant enlargement of the area available for
warrantless arrests. By grafting Katz onto Watson, the majority had allowed the police freedom
to effect warrantless arrests in private areas so long as the suspect was in open view." Comment,
Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Castle, 82 DIcK. L.
REv. 167, 178 (1977). The Supreme Court decisions indicate "that since, historically, probable
cause and not a warrant has been the standard for a valid arrest, the logical result for at least four
members of the Court is that an arrest warrant is not required even for an arrest on private prem-
ises." Comment, supra note 18, at 788.
39. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), prob. jurs.
notedsub nom. Riddick v. New York, 441 U.S. 930 (1979). The Supreme Court has accepted the
Riddick case to address the issue of warrantless in-home arrests in the absence of exigent circum-
stances. If the Riddick case is upheld, the Houle decision might still stand because of the differ-
ence in the method of entry. In Houle the police broke the door down without identifying
themselves and demanding admittance. In Riddick police were peaceably admitted by defend-
ant's child.
1. Plaintiffs represented "a class of persons who are present and former lower-income,
predominantly black residents" in the redevelopment area located in St. Louis, Missouri. Young
v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 1979).
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redevelopment area,2 alleging violations of various federal statutes,3 in-
cluding the Uniform Relocation Act (URA).4 Defendants included the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the City of St.
Louis, and Pershing Redevelopment Corporation,5 all participants in
the redevelopment project.6 Pershing Redevelopment Corporation se-
cured private financing commitments for the redevelopment project,
the only aspect of federal assistance being mortgages insured by HUD.7
Pursuant to the Missouri urban redevelopment statute,8 the City of St.
Louis and the Pershing Redevelopment Corporation agreed9 that the
City would perform certain municipal services' ° and the Developer
2. The court described the area as follows:
The 106-acre area previously had a relatively high concentration of residential dwellings,
but many persons left the area because of its deteriorating condition and high crime rate.
Many of the buildings were abandoned, vacant, and vandalized. Prior to the present
developer's activity, the area had degenerated to the point that only 500 dwelling units
remained occupied. The current plan of development calls for over 2,000 completely
rehabilitated and new units ....
Id. at 873 n.4.
3. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347, 4361-4369 (1976 &
Supp. 1979). 599 F.2d at 873. Plaintiffs also alleged various violations of St. Louis ordinances, but
did not raise these issues on appeal. Id. at 873 n.3.
4. Uniform Relation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976).
5. Pershing Redevelopment Corporation, incorporated as "Missouri Urban Redevelopment
Corporation," see Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 353 (1978), was a wholly owned subsidiary of Pantheon
Corporation, and was also a party to the action.
6. It would appear, however, that several of the appellees have only a tenuous connec-
tion with the redevelopment project and are not appropriate parties in this lawsuit. No
relief is requested against the individual private owners of property, and the St. Louis
Housing Authority has no present or future possessory interest in the redevelopment
area and has had no involvemem with the redevelopment project.
599 F.2d at 872 n.2.
7. Id. at 874. See note 33 infra.
8. An urban development corporation shall have the right to acquire by the exercise of
the power of eminent domain any real property . . . which is necessary to accomplish
the purpose of this chapter, under such conditions and only when so empowered by the
legislative authority of the cities affected by this chapter.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.130(2) (1978).
9. St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 57,217 (June 22, 1976) approved the redevelopment plan and
the agreement between the City of St. Louis and Pershing Redevelopment Corporation.
10. The City agreed to make street, sidewalk, lighting, and park improvements, to aid in the
relocation process, to rezone in accordance with the redevelopment plan, and to "take all other
necessary and proper steps to insure that adequate municipal services consistent with the develop-
ment of the area will be rendered to the Development Area." Id. § 10, reprinted in 599 F.2d at
874-75 n.7.
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would have the power of eminent domain"t in the redevelopment area.
The City obtained Community Block Grant funds under applications
that specified the municipal services to be supplied.'" Plaintiffs claimed
an entitlement to relocation assistance under section 4625(a) of URA t3
as "displaced persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)
(1976).'1 The Eighth Circuit denied injunctive relief and held- A pri-
vate redevelopment corporation, as a delegatee of the state's power of
eminent domain, is not subject to URA requirements in the absence of
evidence establishing "ajoint undertaking in the nature of partnership"
with a state agency.' 5
Congress enacted URA to alleviate the problem of persons displaced
by federal and federally assisted programs.'6 Earlier congressional at-
tempts to deal with the problem took the form of "piecemeal" legisla-
11. 599 F.2d at 873-74. Section three of Ordinance 57,217 approved the agreement confer-
ring the benefits of the statute on Pershing Redevelopment Corporation.
12. 599 F.2d at 875 n.8. The City maintained, however, that these federal funds were not
obligated to the particular project specified in its application. Rather, these funds, together with
general revenues, were intended for city-wide services. Id. at 875.
13. Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken by a
Federal agency in any State will result in the displacement of any person on or after
January 2, 1971, the head of such agency shall provide a relocation assistance advisory
program for displaced persons which shall offer the services described in subsection (c)
of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 4625(a) (1976).
14. The term "displaced person" means any person who, on or after January 2, 1971,
moves from real property, or moves his personal property from real property, as a result
of the acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as the result of the written
order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project under-
taken by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance.
Id. § 4601(6). The developer argued that "URA does not apply to its redevelopment activities in
the Pershing-Waterman area because appellants are not 'displaced persons' because it acquired
real property solely in its capacity as a private developer and without federal financial assistance."
599 F.2d at 876 (footnote omitted).
15. 599 F.2d at 877. The Court also rejected arguments claiming violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act, id. at 878-79, and violations of the Community Development Block
Grant application requirements, id.
16. "[URA] is the culmination of lengthy and extensive efforts to develop legislation estab-
lishing a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons who are displaced, or have
their real property taken for Federal and federally assisted programs." H.R. REP. No. 91-1656,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5850. See gener-
ally Pearlman & Barr, Beyond the Unform Relocation ,4ct: Displacement by State and Local Gov-
eminent, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 329 (1976); Special Research Study, Relocation-The Unform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Act of 1970-An Empirical Study, 26 MERCER L. Rav.
1329 (1975); Note, DisplacedPersons andthe Uniform Relocation 4ct: A Proposed Methodology for
Awarding Benefts, 58 B.U.L. REV. 596 (1978); Comment, The Uniform Relocation Act.' A Viable
Solution to the Plight of the Displaced, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 552 (1976); 46 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 332
(1977).
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tion.1 7 URA sought to establish a uniform, fair, and equitable policy
for the treatment of persons relocated as a result of federal or federally
assisted programs, so that those displaced would not suffer dispropor-
tionate injuries from programs designed to benefit the general public. 18
To accomplish this goal, URA provides relocation assistance to both
the dislocated homeowner' 9 and the dislocated tenant20 when the indi-
vidual qualifies under the statutory definition of "displaced person."
2
'
Litigation arising under URA has focused in part on the meaning of
"displaced person.' 22 A displaced person is one who has moved from
real property acquired "for a program or project undertaken by a Fed-
eral agency, or with Federal financial assistance."23 Although the ex-
pressed legislative intent24 and the statutory definition of "displaced
person" 25 seek to compensate all persons displaced by federally assisted
projects, the operational provisions of the Act narrow the scope of per-
sons entitled to URA benefits. Statutory benefits are available only
when a federal agency or a state instrumentality receiving federal
financial assistance is involved.26
17. Note, supra note 16. at 602. See also 46 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 332, 333-34 (1977).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1976).
19. Id. 994622(a)(l)-(b).
20. Id. 9§ 4622(a)(1), 4624, 4625.
21. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. It is immaterial whether the real property is acquired before or after the effective
date of the bill, or by Federal or State agency; or whether Federal funds contribute to the
cost of the real property. The controlling point is that the real property must be acquired
for a Federal or Federal financially assisted program or project.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1656, 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5850. 5853.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1976).
26. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the broad expression of congressional intention to
compensate all persons displaced by federally funded projects is much more narrowly
implemented in the operational sections of the Act.
Sections 4622, 4627 and 4628 direct that displacement payments be made when the
real property is acquired "... for a program or project undertaken by a Federal
agency".
Relief for persons displaced by action of a State agency that is seeking a grant or
contract "under which Federal financial assistance will be available," is contained in
§ 4630. It requires the head of a Federal agency to refrain from approving a grant to a
State unless he receives satisfactory assurance that the relocation payments provided by
this Act will be accorded.
Nowhere in the statute is there any operational provision calling for payments to a
person, such as the plaintiff, who is displaced by a private entity that has a grant of
Federal financial assistance for its project. On the contrary, the wording of the statute
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/11
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Courts have faced the question of federal finanacial involvement in
two types of situations. The first circumstance is an involuntary federal
governmental acquisition of real property, occurring when, for exam-
ple, HUD forecloses on a federally insured mortgage.27 In Alexander v.
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development28 the
Supreme Court determined that persons dislocated by HUD foreclo-
sures did not qualify for URA benefits because the displacement was
not the result of an acquisition intended to further a federal program or
project.29 The lack of a conscious governmental decision,3 ° therefore,
precludes administration of URA benefits. The second circumstance
resulting in litigation about federal or state involvement is a private
party's acquisition of real property with federal financial assistance.
Most cases have denied benefits in this situation .3  In Moorer v. De-
appears to assume that all "displaced persons" covered by the Act are evicted either
because of projects of Federal agencies or because of projects by State agencies receiving
Federal financial assistance.
Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger, 381 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (D. Mass. 1974) (URA benefits
denied lessee evicted by privately owned educational institution that required leased area for fed-
erally funded project) (footnote omitted), aj'd, 513 F.2d 835 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925
(1975).
27. See Alexander v. HUD, 441 U.S. 39 (1979) (tenants evicted by HUD from project fore-
closed pursuant to federal mortgage insurance denied URA benefits); Blount v. Harris, 451 F.
Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (former resident of nursing home involuntarily acquired by HUD
denied URA benefits), aj7'd, 593 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1979); Harris v. Lynn, 411 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Mo. 1976) (tenants displaced by closing of public housing project denied URA benefits), afijd, 555
F.2d 1357 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977); Caramico v. Romney, 390 F. Supp. 210
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (tenants of foreclosed building with federally insured mortgage denied URA
benefits after HUD required premises to be vacated), aff'd sub nom. Caramico v. Secretary of
HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974).
28. 441 U.S. 39 (1979).
29. Id. at 62-63.
30. Thus, it is clear that the Act contemplates normal government acquisitions, which
are the result of conscious decisions to build a highway here or a housing project or
hospital there. In such cases, the acquisition of property and the relocation of certain
individuals is a necessary first step in the project. Default acquisitions by the FHA,
however, embody no conscious governmental decisions at all. The choice of applying for
an FHA insured mortgage is made by the individual mortgagor and the default, which
triggers the FHA acquisition, is his choice as well (if it can ever be said to result from a
conscious choice). The only voluntary action taken by the Government is the decision to
require unoccupied delivery before making the insurance payment. The acquisition it-
self, however, is clearly involuntary and in response to the default .... In sum, we
believe that Judge Dooling was correct in holding that random acquisitions by the FHA
of defaulted property are not acquisitions "for a program or project undertaken by a
Federal agency" within the contemplation of the drafters of the Relocation Act.
509 F.2d at 698-99 (footnote omitted).
31. See Conway v. Harris, 586 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1978) (tenants displaced by private devel-
oper using federal housing assistance payments in project denied URA benefits); Moorer v. HUD,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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partment of Housing and Urban Development32 a private developer who
received federal interest subsidies and federal mortgage insurance3 3 for
a rehabilitation project evicted the tenants prior to redevelopment. 4
The Eighth Circuit found that Congress intended URA to benefit those
displaced by public agencies with coercive acquisition power. Because
the developer was not a governmental entity with the power of eminent
domain, plaintiffs were not displaced persons entitled to URA bene-
fits.35
In Young v. Harris36 plaintiffs faced the same task as plaintiffs did in
Moorer- proving that the private developer's activities fell within the
scope of the Act. As in Moorer, because federal mortgage insurance 37
was excluded from the statutory definition of "federal financial assist-
ance," 38 plaintiffs needed to show that a state instrumentality or gov-
ernmental entity had undertaken the redevelopment project.39
The Eighth Circuit first rejected an argument that the activities of the
City and the developer were so intertwined as to render the project a
public venture.4" The court found that the provision of municipal serv-
ices within the project area41 was not sufficient to deprive the devel-
oper's project of its private status. 42
561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977) (tenants displaced by private acquisitions assisted by federal mort-
gage insurance and rent subsidies denied URA benefits), ceri. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978); Daw-
son v. HUD, 428 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (persons displaced by private developer using
federal loan insurance and guarantees denied URA benefits), aft'd, 592 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir. 1979);
Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger, 381 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) (lessee evicted by private
educational institution that required leased area for federally funded project denied URA bene-
fits), aIfd, 513 F.2d 835 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975). None of these cases involved a
grant of eminent domain to a private entity.
32. 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
33. Section 4601(4) of URA explicitly excludes any federal guarantee or insurance from the
definition of "[tiederal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 4601(4) (1976).
34. 561 F.2d at 177.
35. Id. at 182-83.
36. 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979).
37. The only direct federal assistance to the project was mortgage insurance by HUD. See
note 7 supra.
38. Pershing Redevelopment Corporation's federal assistance, independent of any participa-
tion by the City, consisted only of mortgage insurance. 599 F.2d at 874. See note 33 supra.
39. 599 F.2d at 877.
40. Id.
41. See note 10 supra.
42. "On this evidence, we cannot say that the assistance provided by the City. . .is sufficient
to deprive the developer's project of its status as a private project. ... 599 F.2d at 877. Implicit
in this conclusion is the presumption of a private status. The court did not, however, justify this
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/11
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Plaintiffs then presented a number of theories focusing on the devel-
oper's activities independent of the City's involvement. First, plaintiffs
sought to equate the fourteenth amendment's definition of state action
with the definition of state instrumentality.43 The court looked to the
legislative history and found that Congress did not intend to incorpo-
rate the fourteenth amendment state action concept into the limited
statutory definition 44 of state agency.
45
Second, plaintiffs asserted that the grant of eminent domain powers
transformed an ordinarily private entity into a state instrumentality.
The Moorer test-whether the project was undertaken by a "govern-
mental entity with the power of eminent domain" 46- left open the
question of URA's application to development by a private entity with
the power of eminent domain. The Young court determined that the
grant of eminent domain should be balanced against the "other factors
reflecting the private nature" of the project to ascertain whether the
private entity constituted a state instrumentality.47 Applying this bal-
ancing test, but without articulating the specific "private nature" fac-
tors to be considered in the analysis, 48 the court stated that the "mere
grant" of eminent domain powers in this case did not transform the
developer into a state entity.49
presumption. The validity of this presumption is questionable in light of the early municipal
involvement in the project. See generally ST. Louis, Mo., REV. CODE §§ 29.010-.390 (1960).
43. 599 F.2d at 877.
44. URA defines "state agency" as any department agency, or instrumentality of a State or of
a political subdivision of a State." 42 U.S.C. § 4601(3) (1976).
45. 599 F.2d at 877.
46. Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978).
47. 599 F.2d at 878.
48. The Court's discussion of the balancing test follows:
Although in Moorer v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, we addressed
the application of the URA in terms of whether the real property had been acquired "by
a governmental entity with the power of eminent domain," this did not imply that the
mere grant of the power of eminent domain created a governmental entity. Although the
grant of the power of eminent domain in some circumstances might indicate the exist-
ence of a state instrumentality within the meaning of the URA, we conclude that the
other factors reflecting the private nature of the redevelopment project outweigh the sig-
nificance of the mere grant of the power in this case. There is no evidence that the
developer used its eminent domain power to cause any displacements. Historically, the
power of eminent domain has been granted by legislative enactment to private corpora-
tions, of which railroads and private utilities are prime examples. This grant does not
transform these private corporations into governmental entities or instrumentalities of
the state.
Id. at 877-78 (citation omitted).
49. ld. at 878.
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The Court concluded that Pershing Redevelopment Corporation and
its parent corporation 50 were private entities despite the grant of emi-
nent domain; thus, their acquisitions of real property were exempt from
URA.5' Because the developer acted as a private entity, the City's re-
ceipt of federal funds was insufficient to invoke URA benefits.52
Young limits the available theories under which URA benefits might
otherwise apply. Young permits some municipal participation, with
federal financial assistance, in a redevelopment program without corre-
sponding URA coverage." The extent of municipal participation
needed to invoke URA benefits remains undefined, although the mini-
mum level of involvement must be significant.
54
Young's balancing test, which weighs the grant of eminent domain
against the private nature of the development,55 is a new judicial tool in
URA analysis. The Eighth Circuit, however, failed to articulate clearly
the factors involved in the test. The Eighth Circuit should forcefully
address these issues when it next examines the Act. Additionally, the
court in Young allowed frustration of the congressional policy behind
URA. Had these plaintiffs been displaced directly by the government,
they would have been entitled to URA benefits. By delegating the
traditional public function of eminent domain, the city thus can gain
the benefits of urban redevelopment, but avoid the compensatory costs
of URA.
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-SECTION 302(b)(3) APPLIES TO
SERIES OF CORPORATE REDEMPTIONS EVEN THOUGH REDEMPTION
PLAN IS NOT CONTRACTUALLY BINDING. Bleil' & Collishaw, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 751 (1979). Petitioner, a California corporation,
owned 225 shares of Maxdon Construction, Inc. (Maxdon), thirty per-
cent of Maxdon's outstanding stock. In order to obtain sole control and
50. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
51. 599 F.2d at 878.
52. Id. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
54. The City of St. Louis was extensively involved in the present case, but the court found
this participation insufficient to make the project a joint undertaking. Id.
55. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
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